

A Novel Secure Distributed Access Control of Data Stored In Clouds

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we propose a new distributed access control scheme for secure data storage in clouds that supports anonymous authentication. In the proposed scheme, the cloud verifies the authenticity of the series without knowing the user's identity before storing data. Our scheme also has the added feature of access control in which only valid users are able to decrypt the stored information. The scheme prevents replay attacks and supports creation, modification, and reading data stored in the cloud. We also address user revocation. Moreover, our authentication and access control scheme is decentralized and robust, unlike other access control schemes designed for clouds which are centralized. The communication, computation, and storage overheads are comparable to centralized approaches.

Keywords—Access control, authentication, attribute-based signatures, attribute-based encryption, cloud storage.

Introduction

RESEARCH in cloud computing is receiving a lot of attention from both academic and industrial worlds. In cloud computing, users can outsource their computation and storage to servers (also called clouds) using Internet. This frees users from the hassles of maintaining resources on-site. Clouds can provide several types of services like applications (e.g., Google Apps, Microsoft online), infrastructures (e.g., Amazon's EC2, Eucalyptus, Nimbus), and platforms to help developers write applications (e.g., Amazon's S3, Windows Azure). Much of the data stored in clouds is highly sensitive, for example, medical records and social networks. Security and privacy are, thus, very important issues in cloud

computing. In one hand, the user should authenticate itself before initiating any transaction, and on the other hand, it must be ensured that the cloud does not tamper with the data that is outsourced. User privacy is also required so that the cloud or other users do not know the identity of the user.

The cloud can hold the user accountable for the data it outsources, and likewise, the cloud is itself accountable for the services it provides. The validity of the user who stores the data is also verified. Apart from the technical solutions to ensure security and privacy, there is also a need for law enforcement.

Recently, Wang et al. addressed secure and dependable cloud storage. Cloud servers prone to Byzantine failure, where a storage server can fail in arbitrary ways. The cloud is also prone to data modification and server colluding attacks. In server colluding attack, the adversary can compromise storage servers, so that it can modify data files as long as they are internally consistent. To provide secure data storage, the data needs to be encrypted. However, the data is often modified and this dynamic property needs to be taken into account while designing efficient secure storage techniques.

Efficient search on encrypted data is also an important concern in clouds. The clouds should not know the query but should be able to return the records that satisfy the query. This is achieved by means of searchable encryption. The keywords are sent to the cloud encrypted, and the cloud returns the result without knowing the actual keyword for the search. The problem here is that the data records should have keywords associated with them to enable the search. The correct

records are returned only when searched with the exact keywords.

RELATED WORK

The authors [12] take a centralized technique where a single key distribution center (KDC) distributes secret keys and attributes to all the users. Unfortunately, a single KDC is not only a single data of failure but difficult to maintain because of the large number of users that are supported in a cloud environment. The receiver receiving the attributes and secret keys from the attribute authority and is able to decrypt the information if it has matching attributes. All the technique takes a centralized approach and allow only one KDC, which is a single point of failure. Case [13] proposed a scheme in which there are several KDC authorities (coordinated by a trusted authority) which distribute attributes and secret keys of the users.

However, the presence of one proxy and one KDC makes it less robust than decentralized approach. A new scheme given by Maji et al. takes a decentralized approach and provides authentication without disclosing the identity of the users.

BACKGROUND

Assumptions:

- Users can have either read or write or both accesses to a file stored in the cloud.
- All communications between users/clouds are secured by the secure shell protocol technique, SSH.

Formats of Access Policies:

- Boolean functions of attributes,
- Linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) matrix of the data [1], or
- Monotone span programs.

Any access structure can be converted into a Boolean function.

An example of a Boolean function is $((a_1 \wedge a_2 \wedge a_3) \vee (a_4 \wedge a_5)) \wedge (a_6 \vee a_7)$, where a_1, a_2, \dots, a_7 are attributes. Let $Y : \{0; 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0; 1\}$ be a monotone Boolean function.. A monotone span program for Y over a field IF is an $n \times t$ matrix M with entries in IF , along with a labeling function $a : [1] \rightarrow [n]$ that associates each row

of M with an input variable of Y , such that, for every $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

- Distributed access control of the data stored in cloud. Only authorized users with valid attributes can access the data.
- Authentication of users only store data and modify their data on the cloud.
- The costs are comparable to the existing centralized approaches; its very expensive operations are mostly done by the cloud.

EXISTING SYSTEM

Existing work on access control in cloud are centralized in nature and, all other schemes use ABE. The scheme in uses a symmetric key approach and does not support authentication. The schemes do not support authentication as well. It provides privacy preserving authenticated access control in cloud. However, the authors take a centralized approach where a single key distribution centre (KDC) distributes secret keys and attributes to all users. Unfortunately, a single KDC is not only a single point of failure but difficult to maintain because of the large number of users that are supported in a cloud environment. We, therefore, emphasize those clouds should take a decentralized approach while distributing secret keys and attributes to users.

It is also quite natural for clouds to have many KDCs in different locations in the world. Although Yang et al. proposed a decentralized approach; their technique does not authenticate users, who want to remain anonymous while accessing the cloud. In an earlier work, Ruj et al. proposed a distributed access control mechanism in clouds.

However, the scheme did not provide user authentication. The other drawback was that a user can create and store a file and other users can only read the file. Write access was not permitted to users other than the creator.

DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:

- The scheme in uses asymmetric key approach and does not support authentication.

- Difficult to maintain because of the large number of users that are supported in a cloud environment.

PROPOSED SYSTEM

In this paper, we propose a new decentralized access control scheme for secure data storage in clouds that supports anonymous authentication. In the proposed scheme, the cloud verifies the authenticity of the series without knowing the user's identity before storing data. Our scheme also has the added feature of access control in which only valid users are able to decrypt the stored information. The scheme prevents replay attacks and supports creation, modification, and reading data stored in the cloud. Distributed access control of data stored in cloud so that only authorized users with valid attributes can access them. Authentication of users who store and modify their data on the cloud. The identity of the user is protected from the cloud during authentication. The architecture is decentralized, meaning that there can be several KDCs for key management. The access control and authentication are both collusion resistant, meaning that no two users can collude and access data or authenticate themselves, if they are individually not authorized. Revoked users cannot access data after they have been revoked. The proposed scheme is resilient to replay attacks. A writer whose attributes and keys have been revoked cannot write back stale information. The protocol supports multiple read and writes on the data stored in the cloud.




Fig. 1. Our secure cloud storage model.

Advantages of Proposed System

- Distributed access control of data stored in cloud so that only authorized users with valid attributes can access them.
- Authentication of users who store and modify their data on the cloud.
- The identity of the user is protected from the cloud during authentication.

Implementation

The system is proposed to have the following modules along with functional requirements.

- System Initialization.
- User Registration.
- KDC setup.
- Attribute generation.
- Sign.
- Verify.

System Initialization:

Select a prime q , and groups G_1 and G_2 , which are of order q . We define the mapping $\hat{e} : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$. Let g_1, g_2 be generators of G_1 and h_j be generators of G_2 , for $j \in [t_{max}]$, for arbitrary t_{max} . Let H be a hash function. Let $A_0 = h(a_0)$, where $a_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is chosen at random. $(TSig, TV_{er})$ mean $TSig$ is the private key with which a message is signed and TV_{er} is the public key used for verification. The secret key for the trustee is $TSK = (a_0, TSig)$ and public key is $TPK = (G_1, G_2, H, g_1, A_0, h_0, h_1, \dots, h_{t_{max}}, g_2, TV_{er})$.

User Registration:

For a user with identity U_u the KDC draws at random $K_{base} \in G$. Let $K_0 = K_1/a_0$ base. The following token γ is output $\gamma = (u, K_{base}, K_0, \rho)$, where ρ is signature on $u || K_{base}$ using the signing key $TSig$.

KDC setup:

We emphasize that clouds should take a decentralized approach while distributing secret keys and attributes to users. It is also quite natural for clouds to have many KDCs in different locations in the world. The architecture is decentralized, meaning that there can be several KDCs for key management.

Attribute generation:

The token verification algorithm verifies the signature contained in γ using the signature verification key TV_{er} in TPK . This algorithm extracts K_{base} from γ using (a, b) from $ASK[i]$ and computes $K_x = K1/(a+bx)_{base}$, $x \in J[i, u]$. The key K_x can be checked for consistency using algorithm $ABS.KeyCheck(TPK, APK[i], \gamma, K_x)$, which checks $\hat{e}(K_x, A_{ij}B_{xij}) = \hat{e}(K_{base}, h_j)$, for all $x \in J[i, u]$ and $j \in [tmax]$.

Sign:

The access policy decides who can access the data stored in the cloud. The creator decides on a claim policy Y , to prove her authenticity and signs the message under this claim. The ciphertext C with signature is c , and is sent to the cloud. The cloud verifies the signature and stores the ciphertext C . When a reader wants to read, the cloud sends C . If the user has attributes matching with access policy, it can decrypt and get back original message.

Verify:

The verification process to the cloud, it relieves the individual users from time consuming verifications. When a reader wants to read some data stored in the cloud, it tries to decrypt it using the secret keys it receives from the KDCs.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a decentralized access control technique with anonymous authentication, which provides user revocation and prevents replay attacks. The cloud does not know the identity of the user who stores information, but only verifies the user's credentials. Key distribution is done in a decentralized way. One limitation is that the cloud knows the access policy for each record stored in the cloud. In future, we would like to hide the attributes and access policy of a user.

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