

## Authentication for Mobile and Advanced Computing

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### ABSTRACT:

With today's technology, many applications rely on the existence of small devices that can exchange information and form communication networks. In a significant portion of such applications, the confidentiality and integrity of the communicated messages are of particular interest. In this work, we propose two novel techniques for authenticating short encrypted messages that are directed to meet the requirements of mobile and pervasive applications. By taking advantage of the fact that the message to be authenticated must also be encrypted, we propose provably secure authentication codes that are more efficient than any message authentication code in the literature. The key idea behind the proposed techniques is to utilize the security that the encryption algorithm can provide to design more efficient authentication mechanisms, as opposed to using standalone authentication primitives.

### Index Terms:

Authentication, unconditional security, computational security, universal hash-function families, pervasive computing.

### INTRODUCTION:

PRESERVING the integrity of messages exchanged over public channels is one of the classic goals in cryptography and the literature is rich with message authentication code (MAC) algorithms that are designed for the sole purpose of preserving message integrity. Based on their security, MACs can be either unconditionally or computationally secure. Unconditionally secure MACs provide message integrity against forgers with unlimited computational power. On the other hand, computationally secure MACs are only secure when forgers have limited computational power. A popular class of unconditionally secure authentication is based on universal hash-function families, pioneered by Carter and Wegman.

Since then, the study of unconditionally secure message authentication based on universal hash functions has been attracting research attention, both from the design and analysis standpoints. The basic concept allowing for unconditional security is that the authentication key can only be used to authenticate a limited number of exchanged messages. Since the management of one-time keys is considered impractical in many applications, computationally secure MACs have become the method of choice for most real-life applications. In computationally secure MACs, keys can be used to authenticate an arbitrary number of messages. That is, after agreeing on a key, legitimate users can exchange an arbitrary number of authenticated messages with the same key. Depending on the main building block used to construct them, computationally secure MACs can be classified into three main categories: block cipher based, cryptographic hash function based, or universal hash function family based.

### Existing System:

We use  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  as the usual notation for the finite integer ring with the addition and multiplication operations performed modulo  $p$ . We use  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  as the usual notation for the multiplicative group modulo  $p$ ; i.e.,  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  contains the integers that are relatively prime to  $p$ . For two strings  $a$  and  $b$  of the same length,  $a \oplus b$  denotes the bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation. For any two strings  $a$  and  $b$  denotes the concatenation operation. For a nonempty set  $S$ , the notation  $s \in S$  denotes the operation of selecting an element from the set  $S$  uniformly at random and assigning it to  $s$ . An important security notion for encryption algorithms that will be used in this paper is indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Let  $A$  be an adversary who is given access oracle to an encryption algorithm,  $E$ , and can ask the oracle to encrypt a polynomial number of messages to get their corresponding ciphertexts. The encryption algorithm is said to be IND-CPA secure if the adversary, after calling the encryption oracle a polynomial number of times, is given a ciphertext corresponding to one of two plaintext messages of her choice.

cannot determine the plaintext corresponding to the given ciphertext with an advantage significantly higher than  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Formally stated, let  $\mathcal{A}$  be the adversary's advantage of determining the plaintext corresponding to the given ciphertext. Then,  $E$  is said to be IND-CPA secure if

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(N),$$

where  $N$  is a security parameter, typically the length of the secret key

### Proposed System:

Let  $N_{\text{max}}$  be an upper bound on the length, in bits, of exchanged messages. That is, messages to be authenticated can be no longer than  $(N_{\text{max}} - 1)$ -bit long. Choose  $p$  to be an  $N$ -bit long prime integer. (If  $N$  is too small to provide the desired security level,  $p$  can be chosen large enough to satisfy the required security level.) Choose an integer  $k_s$  uniformly at random from the multiplicative group  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ ;  $k_s$  is the secret key of the scheme. The prime integer,  $p$ , and the secret key,  $k_s$ , are distributed to legitimate users and will be used for message authentication. Note that the value of  $p$  need not be secret, only  $k_s$  is secret. Let  $E$  be any IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm. Let  $m$  be a short messages ( $N_{\text{max}} - 1$  bit or shorter) that is to be transmitted to the intended receiver in a confidential manner (by encrypting it with  $E$ ). Instead of authenticating the message using a traditional MAC algorithm, consider the following procedure. On input a message  $m$ , a random nonce  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is chosen. (We overload  $m$  to denote both the binary string representing the message, and the integer representation of the message as an element of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . The same applies to  $k_s$  and  $r$ . The distinction between the two representations will be omitted when it is clear from the context.) We assume that integers representing distinct messages are also distinct, which can be achieved by appropriately encoding messages.

### FROM WEAK TO STRONG UNFORGEABILITY:

As per [59], there are two notions of unforgeability in authentication codes. Namely, a MAC algorithm can be weakly unforgeable under chosen message attacks (WUF-CMA), or strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks (SUF-CMA). A MAC algorithm is said to be SUFCMA if, after launching chosen message attacks, it is infeasible to forge a message-tag pair that will be

accepted as valid regardless of whether the message is "new" or not, as long as the tag has not been previously attached to the message by an authorized user. If it is only hard to forge valid tags for "new" messages, the MAC algorithm is said to be WUF-CMA.




Fig. 2. The cipher block chaining mode of encryption used for message encryption. The random number,  $r$ , is treated as the first block of the plaintext.

### ENCRYPTING WITH PSEUDORANDOM PERMUTATIONS (BLOCK CIPHERS):

In this section, we describe a message authentication approach that is faster than the one described in previous sections. The main idea of this approach is that the input output relation of the used encryption operation can be realized as a pseudorandom permutation. In what follows, we will show how to utilize the pseudo randomness of block ciphers in a novel way to further improve the efficiency of the authentication algorithm of Section 3.

### Performance Discussion:

First, we compare the scheme of this section to the scheme of Section 3, and then compare it to single-pass schemes. Assuming devices are already equipped with a secure block cipher to encrypt messages, the authentication technique of this section requires only one modular addition. While addition is performed in  $O(\log n)$  time, the fastest integer multiplication algorithms typically require  $O(n \log n \log \log n)$  time. Therefore, as efficient as the scheme proposed in Section 3, the authentication technique of this section is at least  $O(\log n \log \log n)$  faster. Complexity analysis, however, can be inaccurate by absorbing large constants. This is indeed the case in comparing the basic scheme of Section 3 to the scheme of this section. For  $n = 2^{32}$ , the simple addition of this scheme runs in about 0.02 cycles/byte as opposed to the 1.5 cycles/byte of the previous scheme. The reason that the improvement is better than  $O(\log n \log \log n)$  is mainly due to the modular reduction. That is, while reduction modulo a prime integer is a nontrivial operation, reduction modulo  $2^n$  can be performed by simply stopping at the  $n$ th bit.

## Security Model:

Recall that, to model the security of a message authentication scheme in the standard setup, a probabilistic polynomial time adversary,  $A$ , is given oracle access to the signing and verifying algorithms, and challenged to generate a new message-tag pair that will be accepted as valid, for a tag that has not been attached to the message by the signing oracle. Observe, however, that the message to be authenticated in our setup must also be encrypted. That is, what the intended user receives is a cipher text-tag pair, as opposed to plaintext-tag pair in the standard model. This implies that the adversary must come up with a valid cipher text-tag pair for a successful forgery. In what follows, we modify the standard model of Section 2 to address the difference between standard MACs and our MAC in which the message must be encrypted.

## Security Analysis:

In this section, we prove the privacy of the system, give a formal security analysis of the proposed message authentication mechanism, and then discuss the security of the composed authenticated encryption system.

## CONCLUSION:

In this work, a new technique for authenticating short encrypted messages is proposed. The fact that the message to be authenticated must also be encrypted is used to deliver a random nonce to the intended receiver via the ciphertext. This allowed the design of an authentication code that benefits from the simplicity of unconditionally secure authentication without the need to manage one-time keys. In particular, it has been demonstrated in this paper that authentication tags can be computed with one addition and a one modular multiplication. Given that messages are relatively short, addition and modular multiplication can be performed faster than existing computationally secure MACs in the literature of cryptography. When devices are equipped with block ciphers to encrypt messages, a second technique that utilizes the fact that block ciphers can be modeled as strong pseudorandom permutations is proposed to authenticate messages using a single modular addition. The proposed schemes are shown to be orders of magnitude faster, and consume orders of magnitude less energy than traditional MAC algorithms. Therefore, they are more suitable to be used in computationally constrained mobile and pervasive devices.

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