

Client's Key Exposure Resistance Method in Cloud Storage



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ABSTRACT

Cloud storage auditing is viewed as an important service to verify the integrity of the data in public cloud. Current auditing protocols are all based on the assumption that the client's secret key for auditing is absolutely secure. However, such assumption may not always be held, due to the possibly weak sense of security and/or low security settings at the client. If such a secret key for auditing is exposed, most of the current auditing protocols would inevitably become unable to work. In this paper, we focus on this new aspect of cloud storage auditing. We investigate how to reduce the damage of the client's key exposure in cloud storage auditing, and give the first practical solution for this new problem setting. We formalize the definition and the security model of auditing protocol with key-exposure resilience and propose such a protocol. In our design, we employ the binary tree structure and the preorder traversal technique to update the secret keys for the client. We also develop a novel authenticator construction to support the forward security and the property of blockless verifiability. The security proof and the performance analysis show that our proposed protocol is secure and efficient.

INTRODUCTION

Cloud storage auditing is used to verify the integrity of the data stored in public cloud, which is one of the important security techniques in cloud storage. In recent years, auditing protocols for cloud storage have


attracted much attention and have been researched intensively. These protocols focus on several different aspects of auditing, and how to achieve high bandwidth and computation efficiency is one of the essential concerns. For that purpose, the Homomorphic Linear Authenticator (HLA) technique that supports blockless verification is explored to reduce the overhead of computation and communication in auditing protocols, which allows the auditor to verify the integrity of the data in cloud without retrieving the whole data. Many cloud storage auditing protocols like have been proposed based on this technique. The privacy protection of data is also an important aspect of cloud storage auditing. In order to reduce the computational burden of the client, a third-party auditor (TPA) is introduced to help the client to periodically check the integrity of the data in cloud. However, it is possible for the TPA to get the client's data after it executes the auditing protocol multiple times. Auditing protocols are designed to ensure the privacy of the client's data in cloud. Another aspect having been addressed in cloud storage auditing is how to support data dynamic operations. Wang et al. have proposed an auditing protocol supporting fully dynamic data operations including modification, insertion and deletion. Auditing protocols can also support dynamic data operations. Other aspects, such as proxy auditing, user revocation and eliminating certificate management in cloud storage auditing have also been studied. Though many research works about cloud storage auditing have been done in recent years, a

critical security problem—the key exposure problem for cloud storage auditing, has remained unexplored in previous researches. While all existing protocols focus on the faults or dishonesty of the cloud, they have overlooked the possible weak sense of security and/or low security settings at the client. In fact, the client's secret key for cloud storage auditing may be exposed, even known by the cloud, due to several reasons. Firstly, the key management is a very complex procedure which involves many factors including system policy, user training, etc. One client often needs to manage varieties of keys to complete different security tasks. Any careless mistake or fault in managing these keys would make the key exposure possible. It is not uncommon to see a client choosing to use cheap software-based key management for economical factors, which may only provide limited protection and make the sensitive secret keys vulnerable to exposure.

Secondly, the client himself may be the target and vulnerable to many Internet based security attacks. For an ordinary client, the sense of security protection can be relatively weaker, compared with the case of enterprises and organizations. Hence, it is possible for a client to unintentionally download malicious software from Internet or to overlook the timely security patch to their computer system. Both of these cases could give the hacker easy access to their secret keys. Last but not the least, the cloud also has incentives to get clients' secret keys for storage auditing, e.g., through trading with the aforementioned hackers. Specifically, if the cloud gets these keys, it can regenerate the fake data and forge their authenticators to easily hide the data loss incidents, e.g., caused by Byzantine failures, from the client, while maintaining its reputation. In the malicious case, it can even discard the client's data that are rarely accessed to save the storage space, without worrying about failure to pass the auditing protocol initiated by the client. Obviously, the auditing secret key exposure could be disastrous for the clients of cloud storage applications. Therefore, how to deal with the client's secret key exposure for cloud storage

auditing is a very important problem. Unfortunately, previous auditing protocols did not consider this critical issue, and any exposure of the client's secret auditing key would make most of the existing auditing protocols unable to work correctly. In this paper, we focus on how to reduce the damage of the client's key exposure in cloud storage auditing. Our goal is to design a cloud storage auditing protocol with built-in key-exposure resilience. How to do it efficiently under this new problem setting brings in many new challenges to be addressed below. First of all, applying the traditional solution of key revocation to cloud storage auditing is not practical. This is because, whenever the client's secret key for auditing is exposed, the client needs to produce a new pair of public key and secret key and regenerate the authenticators for the client's data previously stored in cloud. The process involves the downloading of whole data from the cloud, producing new authenticators, and re-uploading everything back to the cloud, all of which can be tedious and cumbersome. Besides, it cannot always guarantee that the cloud provides real data when the client regenerates new authenticators. Secondly, directly adopting standard key-evolving technique is also not suitable for the new problem setting. It can lead to retrieving all of the actual files blocks when the verification is proceeded. This is partly because the technique is incompatible with block less verification. The resulting authenticators cannot be aggregated, leading to unacceptably high computation and communication cost for the storage auditing.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE:



MODULES DESCRIPTION:

Client:

The client produces files and uploads these files along with corresponding authenticators to the cloud. The client can periodically audit whether his files in cloud are correct. The client will update his secret keys for cloud storage auditing in the end of each time period, but the public key is always unchanged.

TPA:

In order to reduce the computational burden of the client, a third-party auditor (TPA) is introduced to help the client to periodically check the integrity of the data in cloud. However, it is possible for the TPA to get the client's data after it executes the auditing protocol multiple times.

Auditing protocols are designed to ensure the privacy of the client's data in cloud. Another aspect having been addressed in cloud storage auditing is how to support data dynamic operations.

Cloud:

Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources. Cloud computing and storage solutions provide users and enterprises with various capabilities to store and process their data in third-party data centers. It relies on sharing of resources to achieve coherence and economies of scale, similar to a utility (like the electricity grid) over a network. At the foundation of cloud computing is the broader concept of converged infrastructure and shared services.

Key Exposure Resistance:


The client needs to produce a new pair of public key and secret key and regenerate the authenticators for the client's data previously stored in cloud. There is a one-time public key sharing for each file and a Time Stamp based secret key Generation. For each instance the timestamp based key exposure will be vary according to the current time stamp.

SCREEN SHOTS:


Home:



Registration:




Client Login:



Client Home:



File Stored into Cloud:



Share File in Cloud:




Assign Public Key:



Cloud:



Key Shared with TPA:



TPA Home:



CONCLUSION

In this paper, we study on how to deal with the client's key exposure in cloud storage auditing. We propose a new paradigm called auditing protocol with key-exposure resilience. In such a protocol, the integrity of the data previously stored in cloud can still be verified even if the client's current secret key for cloud storage auditing is exposed. We formalize the definition and the security model of auditing protocol with key-exposure resilience, and then propose the first practical solution. The security proof and the asymptotic performance evaluation show that the proposed protocol is secure and efficient.

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