

## **Distributed, Contemporary, And Independent Access To Encrypted Cloud Databases**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

Placing critical data to a cloud provider data at rest, in motion, come with a guarantee of security and availability, and be in use. Data privacy is a service paradigm for database storage services solutions are still immature in many ways. We have data on the encrypted data confidentiality and the opportunity to run concurrent operations that connects to the cloud database services, proposed a novel structure. The encrypted database connected directly to the cloud, and modifying the structure of the database, including the implementation of joint and independent operations, the first solution that helps geographically distributed clients. The proposed building the internal cloud-based solutions that the elasticity, availability, and scalability feature that limit the further advantage of eliminating intermediate agents. The ability of the proposed building clients and network latencies TPC- C standard benchmark to different numbers based on the implementation of innovative and extensive theoretical analysis of the experimental results evaluated.

### **I. INTRODUCTION:**

Cloud computing can and does mean different things to different people. The common characteristics most interpretations share are on-demand scalability of highly available and reliable pooled computing resources, secure access to metered services from nearly anywhere, and displacement of data and services from inside to outside the organization. While aspects of these characteristics have been realized to a certain extent, cloud computing remains a work in progress. This publication provides an overview of the security and privacy challenges pertinent to public cloud computing and points out considerations organizations should take when outsourcing data, applications, and infrastructure to a public cloud environment. This article describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of Depot, a cloud storage system that minimizes trust assumptions.

Depot tolerates buggy or malicious behavior by any number of clients or servers, yet it provides safety and liveness guarantees to correct clients. Depot provides these guarantees using two-layer architecture. First, Depot ensures that the updates observed by correct nodes are consistently ordered under Fork-Join-Causal consistency (FJC). FJC is a slight weakening of causal consistency that can be both safe and live despite faulty nodes. Second, Depot implements protocols that use this consistent ordering of updates to provide other desirable consistency, staleness, durability, and recovery properties. Our evaluations suggests that the costs of these guarantees are modest and that Depot can tolerate faults and maintain good availability, latency, overhead, and staleness even when significant faults occur. We explore a novel paradigm for data management in which a third party service provider hosts “database as a service”, providing its customers with seamless mechanisms to create, store, and access their databases at the host site. Such a model alleviates the need for organizations to purchase expensive hardware and software, deal with software upgrades, and hire professionals for administrative and maintenance tasks which are taken over by the service provider.

We have developed and deployed a database service on the Internet, called NetDB2, which is in constant use. In a sense, a data management model supported by NetDB2 provides an effective mechanism for organizations to purchase data management as a service, thereby freeing them to concentrate on their core businesses. Among the primary challenges introduced by “database as a service” are the additional overhead of remote access to data, an infrastructure to guarantee data privacy, and user interface design for such a service. These issues are investigated. We identify data privacy as a particularly vital problem and propose alternative solutions based on data encryption. The paper is meant as a challenge for the database community to explore a rich set of research issues that arise in developing such a service.

## II. RELATED WORK:

We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -- i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -- that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable. Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable. Lattice-based cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1.

Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a public-key ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits. Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable -- i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypted to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypted, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypted in a server-aided cryptosystem.




FIG 1:SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

## III.SYSTEM PREMELIRIES:

### A. SETUP PHASE:

We describe how to initialize a Secure DBaaS architecture from a cloud database service acquired by a tenant from a cloud provider. We assume that the DBA creates the metadata storage table that at the beginning contains just the database metadata, and not the table metadata. The DBA populates the database metadata through the Secure DBaaS client by using randomly generated encryption keys for any combinations of data types and encryption types, and stores them in the metadata storage table after encryption through the master key. Then, the DBA distributes the master key to the legitimate users. User access control policies are administrated by the DBA through some standard data control language as in any unencrypted database. In the following steps, the DBA creates the tables of the encrypted database.

### B. META DATA MODULE:

We develop Meta data. So our system does not require a trusted broker or a trusted proxy because tenant data and metadata stored by the cloud database are always encrypted. In this module, we design such as Tenant data, data structures, and metadata must be encrypted before exiting from the client. The information managed by SecureDBaaS includes plaintext data, encrypted data, metadata, and encrypted metadata. Plaintext data consist of information that a tenant wants to store and process remotely in the cloud DBaaS. SecureDBaaS clients produce also a set of metadata consisting of information required to encrypt and decrypt data as well as other administration information. Even metadata are encrypted and stored in the cloud DBaaS.

### C. SEQUENTIAL SQL OPERATIONS:

The first connection of the client with the cloud DBaaS is for authentication purposes. Secure DBaaS relies on standard authentication and authorization mechanisms provided by the original DBMS server. After the authentication, a user interacts with the cloud database through the Secure DBaaS client.. Secure DBaaS analyzes the original operation to identify which tables are involved and to retrieve their metadata from the cloud database. The metadata are decrypted through the master key and their information is used to translate the original plain SQL into a query that operates on the encrypted database.

Translated operations contain neither plaintext database (table and column names) nor plaintext tenant data. Nevertheless, they are valid SQL operations that the Secure DBaaS client can issue to the cloud database. Translated operations are then executed by the cloud database over the encrypted tenant data. As there is a one-to-one correspondence between plaintext tables and encrypted tables, it is possible to prevent a trusted database user from accessing or modifying some tenant data by granting limited privileges on some tables. User privileges can be managed directly by the untrusted and encrypted cloud database. The results of the translated query that includes encrypted tenant data and metadata are received by the Secure DBaaS client, decrypted, and delivered to the user. The complexity of the translation process depends on the type of SQL statement.

## **D. CONCURRENT SQL OPERATIONS:**

The support to concurrent execution of SQL statements issued by multiple independent (and possibly geographically distributed) clients is one of the most important benefits of Secure DBaaS with respect to state-of-the-art solutions. Our architecture must guarantee consistency among encrypted tenant data and encrypted metadata because corrupted or out-of-date metadata would prevent clients from decoding encrypted tenant data resulting in permanent data losses. A thorough analysis of the possible issues and solutions related to concurrent SQL operations on encrypted tenant data. Here, we remark the importance of distinguishing two classes of statements that are supported by Secure DBaaS: SQL operations not causing modifications to the database structure, such as read, write, and update; operations involving alterations of the database structure through creation, removal, and modification of database tables (data definition layer operators).


## **IV. CONCLUSION:**

We propose an innovative architecture that guarantees confidentiality of data stored in public cloud databases. Unlike state-of-the-art approaches, our solution does not rely on an intermediate proxy that we consider a single point of failure and a bottleneck limiting availability and scalability of typical cloud database services. A large part of the research includes solutions to support concurrent SQL operations (including statements modifying the database structure) on encrypted data issued by heterogeneous and possibly geographically dispersed clients.

The proposed architecture does not require modifications to the cloud database, and it is immediately applicable to existing cloud DBaaS, such as the experimented PostgreSQL Plus Cloud Database [23], Windows Azure [24], and Xeround [22]. There are no theoretical and practical limits to extend our solution to other platforms and to include new encryption algorithms. It is worth observing that experimental results based on the TPC-C standard benchmark show that the performance impact of data encryption on response time becomes negligible because it is masked by network latencies that are typical of cloud scenarios. In particular, concurrent read and write operations that do not modify the structure of the encrypted database cause negligible overhead. Dynamic scenarios characterized by (possibly) concurrent modifications of the database structure are supported, but at the price of high computational costs. These performance results open the space to future improvements that we are investigating.

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