



Protecting Wireless Networks from Identity Theft (Spoofing) using the spatial correlation of received signal strength.

Gudipudi Chandana Theja

MTech Student

Department of Computer Science Engineering
ST.Mary's Group of Institutions, Chebrolu, Guntur

SD Nagul Meera

Assistant Professor

Department of Computer Science Engineering
ST.Mary's Group of Institutions, Chebrolu, Guntur

Abstract:

In the context of network security, a spoofing attack is a situation in which one person or program successfully masquerades as another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage. Many of the protocols in the TCP/IP suite do not provide mechanisms for authenticating the source or destination of a message. They are thus vulnerable to spoofing attacks when extra precautions are not taken by applications to verify the identity of the sending or receiving host. IP spoofing and ARP spoofing in particular may be used to leverage man-in-the-middle attacks against hosts on a computer network. Spoofing attacks which take advantage of TCP/IP suite protocols may be mitigated with the use of firewalls capable of deep packet inspection or by taking measures to verify the identity of the sender or recipient of a message. In wireless networks, Spoofing attacks are relatively simple to launch as result it degrades the overall performance of the networks. To identify an attacker node, it can be verified through cryptographic authentication, authentication is always not possible because it requires key management and additional infrastructural overhead. The proposed approach is used for 1) Detecting spoofing attacks 2) Determining the number of attackers when multiple adversaries masquerading the same node identity and 3) Localizing multiple adversaries. The proposed system uses spatial correlation of received signal strength (RSS) to detect the spoofing attacks. Cluster-based mechanisms are introduced to determine the number of attackers. In this paper, K-Nearest-Neighbor classifier (KNN) is proposed to improve the performance of determining the number of attacks. Finally, An Integrated Detection and Localization system is used to localize the positions of multiple attackers.

Keywords: Wireless network security, Spoofing attack, Localization, Detection.

Introduction:

Wireless security is just an aspect of computer security, however organizations may be particularly vulnerable to security breaches caused by rogue access points. If an employee (trusted entity) brings in a wireless router and plugs it into an unsecured switchport, the entire network can be exposed to anyone within range of the signals. Similarly, if an employee adds a wireless interface to a networked computer via an open USB port, they may create a breach in network security that would allow access to confidential materials. However, there are effective countermeasures (like disabling open switchports during switch configuration and VLAN configuration to limit network access) that are available to protect both the network and the information it contains, but such countermeasures must be applied uniformly to all network devices.

Due to its availability and low cost, the use of wireless communication technologies increases in domains beyond the originally intended usage areas, e.g. M2M communication in industrial applications. Such industrial applications often have specific security requirements. Hence, it is important to understand the characteristics of such applications and evaluate the vulnerabilities bearing the highest risk in this context. An evaluation of these vulnerabilities and the resulting vulnerability catalogues in an industrial context when considering WLAN, NFC and ZigBee can be found here.

Identity theft (or MAC spoofing) occurs when a hacker is able to listen in on network traffic and identify the MAC address of a computer with network privileges. Most wireless systems allow some kind of MAC filtering to allow only authorized computers with specific MAC IDs to gain access and utilize the network. However, programs exist that have network "sniffing" capabilities. Combine these programs with other software that allow a computer to pretend it has any MAC address that the hacker desires, and the hacker can easily get around that hurdle.



MAC filtering is effective only for small residential (SOHO) networks, since it provides protection only when the wireless device is "off the air". Any 802.11 device "on the air" freely transmits its unencrypted MAC address in its 802.11 headers, and it requires no special equipment or software to detect it. Anyone with an 802.11 receiver (laptop and wireless adapter) and a freeware wireless packet analyzer can obtain the MAC address of any transmitting 802.11 within range. In an organizational environment, where most wireless devices are "on the air" throughout the active working shift, MAC filtering provides only a false sense of security since it prevents only "casual" or unintended connections to the organizational infrastructure and does nothing to prevent a directed attack.

EXISTING SYSTEM:

- Ingress / Egress Filtering:
- Ingress – An ISP prohibits receiving from its stub connected networks packets whose source address does not belong to the corresponding stub network address space
- Egress – A router or a firewall which is the gateway of a stub network filters out any packet whose source address does not belong to the network address space.

DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:

- Allows Spoofing within a stub network
- Not self defensive
- Effective only when implemented by large number of networks
- Deployment is costly
- Incentive for an ISP is very low

PROPOSED SYSTEM:

- The proposed System used Inter domain Packet filters (IDPFs) architecture, a system that can be constructed solely based on the locally exchanged BGP updates.
- Each node only selects and propagates to neighbors based on two set of routing policies. They are Import and Export Routing policies.
- The IDPFs uses a feasible path from source node to the destination node, and a packet can reach to the destination through one of its upstream neighbors.
- The training data is available, we explore using Support Vector Machines (SVM) method to further improve the accuracy of determining the number of attackers.

•In localization results using a representative set of algorithms provide strong evidence of high accuracy of localizing multiple adversaries.

•The Cluster Based wireless Sensor Network data received signal strength (RSS) based spatial correlation of network Strategy.

•A physical property associated with each wireless device that is hard to falsify and not reliant on cryptography as the basis for detecting spoofing attacks in wireless networks.

ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:

- Damage Reduction under SPM Defense is high
- Client Traffic
- Comparing to other methods the benefits of SPM are more.
- SPM is generic because their only goal is to filter spoofed packets.

MODULES:

- Blind & Non-Blind Spoofing
- Man in the Middle Attack
- Constructing Routing Table
- Finding Feasible path
- Constructing Inter-Domain Packet Filters
- Receiving the valid packets

MODULES DESCRIPTION

Blind & Non-Blind Spoofing:

•Spoofing detection is to devise strategies that use the uniqueness of spatial information.

•In location directly as the attackers' positions are unknown network RSS, a property closely correlated with location in physical space and is readily available in the wireless networks.

•The RSS readings at the same physical location are similar, whereas the RSS readings at different locations in physical space are distinctive.

•The number of attackers when there are multiple adversaries masquerading as the same identity.

Man in the Middle Attack:

•Localization is based on the assumption that all measurements gathered received signal strength (RSS) are from a single station and, based on this assumption, the

localization algorithm matches a point in the measurement space with a point in the physical space.

- The spoofing attack, the victim and the attacker are using the same ID to transmit data packets, and the RSS readings of that ID is the mixture readings measured from each individual node.

- RSS-based spatial correlation to find out the distance in signal space and further detect the presence of spoofing attackers in physical space.

Constructing Routing Table:

- The channel frequency response is sensitive to each multipath. An impulse in the time domain is a constant in the frequency domain, and thus a change to a single path may change the entire multiple tone link of Network.

- In wireless networks classes that provide automatic reconfiguration of APs, adjusting power levels and channel assignments to optimize coverage while minimizing contention between neighbors.

- The RSS readings over time from the same physical location will belong to the same cluster points in the n-dimensional signal space.

Finding feasible path (Attack Computation):

- Converting the large dataset into medium format for the computation purpose.

- In this medium the rows consists of http request and columns consists of time for a particular user (IP address).

- Received Signal Strength Indicator Formula,

$$P(d)[dBm] = P(d_0)[dBm] - 10\gamma \log_{10} \left(\frac{d}{d_0} \right)$$

- The RSS stream of a node identity may be mixed with RSS readings of both the original node as well as spoofing nodes from different physical locations.

Constructing Inter-Domain Packet Filters:

- The clustering algorithms cannot tell the difference between real RSS clusters formed by attackers at different positions and fake RSS clusters caused by outliers and variations of the signal strength.

- The minimum distance between two clusters is large indicating that the clusters are from different physical locations.

- The minimum distance between the returned clusters to make sure the clusters are produced by attackers instead of RSS variations and outliers.


Receiving different Transmission Power:


- The transmission power levels when performing spoofing attacks so that the localization system cannot estimate its location accurately.

- The CDF of localization error of RADAR-Gridded and ABP when adversaries using different transmission power levels.

- In detection mechanisms are highly effective in both detecting the presence of attacks with detection rates over 98% and determining the number of network.

Data Flow Diagram:





Conclusion

This project proposed to use received signal strength-based spatial correlation, a physical property associated with each wireless device that is hard to falsify and not reliant on cryptography as the basis for detecting spoofing attacks in wireless networks. It provided theoretical analysis of using the spatial correlation of RSS inherited from wireless nodes for attack detection. It derived the test statistic based on the cluster analysis of RSS readings. The approach can both detect the presence of attacks as well as determine the number of adversaries, spoofing the same node identity, so that can localize any number of attackers and eliminate them. In addition, a zone-based node compromise detection scheme is proposed using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). Furthermore, several possible attacks are described against the proposed scheme and proposed counter-measures against these attacks. The scheme is

evaluated in simulation under various scenarios. The experimental results show that the scheme quickly detects untrustworthy zones with a small number of zone-trust reports.

REFERENCES

- [1]. Jie Yang, Yingying Chen, and Jerry Cheng, "Detection and Localization of Multiple Spoofing Attackers in Wireless Networks" in IEEE 2012.
- [2]. J. Bellardo and S. Savage, "802.11 denial-of-service attacks: Real vulnerabilities and practical solutions," in *Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium*, 2003, pp. 15 – 28.
- [3]. F. Ferreri, M. Bernaschi, and L. Valcamonici, "Access points vulnerabilities to dos attacks in 802.11 networks," in *Proceedings of the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference*, 2004.
- [4]. D. Faria and D. Cheriton, "Detecting identity-based attacks in wireless networks using signalprints," in *Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe)*, September 2006.
- [5]. Q. Li and W. Trappe, "Relationship-based detection of spoofing-related anomalous traffic in ad hoc networks," in *Proc. IEEE SECON*, 2006.
- [6]. B. Wu, J. Wu, E. Fernandez, and S. Magliveras, "Secure and efficient key management in mobile ad hoc networks," in *Proc. IEEE IPDPS*, 2005.
- [7]. A. Wool, "Lightweight key management for ieee 802.11 wireless lans with key refresh and host revocation," *ACM/Springer Wireless Networks*, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 677–686, 2005.
- [8]. Y. Sheng, K. Tan, G. Chen, D. Kotz, and A. Campbell, "Detecting 802.11 MAC layer spoofing using received signal strength," in *Proc. IEEE INFOCOM*, April 2008.
- [9]. J. Yang, Y. Chen, and W. Trappe, "Detecting spoofing attacks in mobile wireless environments," in *Proc. IEEE SECON*, 2009.
- [10]. Y. Chen, W. Trappe, and R. P. Martin, "Detecting and localizing wireless spoofing attacks," in *Proc. IEEE SECON*, May 2007.
- [11]. M. bohge and W. Trappe, "An authentication framework for hierarchical ad hoc sensor networks," in *Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe)*, 2003, pp. 79–87.