

Design of Performance Adiabatic Dynamic Differential Logic (PADDL) For Secure Integrated Circuits

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Abstract:

In the modern world secure data transfer and privacy is becoming a major problem. Smart cards and other embedded devices use an encryption technology for secure data transfer. To design successful security-centric designs, the low-level hardware must contain built-in protection mechanisms to supplement cryptographic algorithms, such as advanced encryption standard and triple data encryption standard by preventing side-channel attacks, such as differential power analysis (DPA). Dynamic logic obfuscates the output waveforms and the circuit operation, reducing the effectiveness of the DPA attack. For stronger mitigation of DPA attacks, we proposed this design and analysis using high-performance adiabatic dynamic differential logic (PADDL) for secure integrated circuit (IC) design. Such an approach is effective in reducing power consumption.

Index Terms: Adiabatic logic, differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, forward body biasing, reversible logic.

INTRODUCTION

SMART cards are small integrated circuits (ICs) embedded onto plastic or tokens, and are used for authentication, identification, and personal data storage. They are used by the military, in automatic teller machines, mobile phone subscriber identity

module cards, by schools for tracking class attendance, and storing certificates for use in secure web browsing. They are also used internationally as alternatives to credit and debits cards by Euro pay, MasterCard, and Visa. They are application specific, so their size and software overhead may be minimized. In addition, smart cards use tamper-resistant secure file cryptosystems. They are more difficult to forge than tokens, money, and government-issued identification cards.

They can be programmed to deter theft by preventing immediate reuse, making them more effective than cards with magnetic strips. Due to their emphasis on security at both the software and hardware levels, smart-card technology is emerging as the platform of choice in key vertical markets. Smart-card technology is moving toward multiple applications, higher interoperability, and multiple interfaces, such as TCP/IP, near-field communicators, and contactless chips. Due to their recent proliferation, smart cards are targets of attacks motivated by identity theft, fraud, and fare evasion. Despite their secure software design, smart cards may still be susceptible to side-channel attacks, which are based on correlations of leaked secondary information and the IC output signals. In smart cards, these include electromagnetic emanations (EM leakage), measuring the amount of time required to perform private-key operations, and analysis of noisy power consumption. One of the most effective

attacks is a differential power analysis (DPA) attack, where the attacker analyzes the power consumption in the IC and compares it to the ICs output signals. The leaked side-channel information is due to the presence of entropy gain in the system. These attacks are effective, since most modern computing technology is CMOS based, and the power consumption tendencies of these devices are well studied. Reducing the power consumption of the circuit makes a DPA attack more difficult.

Reversible logic is a promising design paradigm for the implementation of ultralow power computing structures with minimal entropy gain. This is because quantum mechanics principles govern the physical limitations of computing devices. These systems dissipate energy due to bit erasure within their interconnected primitive structures, which is an important consideration as transistor density increases. Adiabatic logic is an implementation of reversible logic in CMOS where the current flow through the circuit is controlled such that the energy dissipation due to switching and capacitor dissipation is minimized. This is accomplished by recycling circuit energy rather than dissipating it into the surrounding environment. This is beneficial for CMOS implementations, since the input and output charges are kept separate. Adiabatic logic implementations of CMOS have been used to improve power consumption in comparison to pass transistor logic.

In this paper, we propose the use of body-biased adiabatic dynamic differential logic (BADDL) for reducing the effectiveness of DPA attacks on CMOS-based secure IC devices. In Section II, we present the motivation and background for low-power secure IC design. First, the methods for implementing a DPA attacks are discussed. Next, we review the benchmarks of previous methods of mitigating these attacks, such as wave differential dynamic logic (WDDL) and secure differential multiplexer logic using pass transistors (SDMLp) and a taxonomy of previous works is provided in Fig. 1. In Section III, we present design and analysis using high-performance adiabatic

dynamic differential logic (PADDL) for mitigating DPA attacks, which is a novel universal cell that performs AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, and XNOR operations. The average power, instantaneous power, and differential power of the PADDL cell are compared with the same metrics of conventional NAND, NOR, and XNOR gates. Then, PADDL is compared with WDDL and SDMLp. In Section IV, body biasing of nMOS transistors in PADDL is used to improve the operating frequency and differential power of ultralow power devices.

MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND

Secure Integrated Chip Design:

Smart cards consist of a secure integrated chip, which contains the main processor, arithmetic logic unit, processing registers, random access memory for arithmetic processing, read-only memory (ROM) for storing the operating system, and electrically erasable programmable ROM for data memory. The operating system controls data access and implements the cryptographic security algorithms. The international standard for contact-based smart cards electronic identification cards is the ISO/IEC 7816 [12], and the contactless smart card is the ISO/IEC 14443 [53]. In this standard, smart cards use the triple data encryption standard (DES), and the standard operating frequency is 13.56 MHz.

DPA Attacks:

Since the design of smart cards has been standardized, and their development is moving from single issuer models to cooperative private-public sector partnerships, a two-prong approach to smart card security is required: software-systems security and hardware-oriented security. Even though smart cards utilize operating systems with cryptographic kernels, the memory devices used to store them are not isolated in perfectly tamper-proof locations. As a result, analysis of a chip's operation metrics, such as differential power consumption, total execution time, magnetic field values, and radio frequencies allows attackers to gain sensitive user data.

The effectiveness of these side-channel attacks was demonstrated in [5]. Kocher demonstrated that attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor Rivest-Shamir Adleman (RSA) keys, and break other cryptosystems by analyzing power consumption and private key execution time. The use of power consumption to obtain compromising information is known as a DPA attack. The attacker analyzes information gleaned from the practical implementation details of otherwise secure algorithms. Most modern computing systems use CMOS technology, and the dynamic power consumption of a CMOS gate is proportional to its input signals. Therefore, analyzing the output power consumption allows the attacker to determine a correlation between the data and the key, since the switching in the CMOS gates is dependent on those inputs.

DPA Prevention:

The primary drawback with addressing DPA attacks at the software level is that the power and current variations being analyzed by attacker occur at the hardware level, and no software algorithm, however effective, can affect the operation of a CMOS gate once it receives an input signal. For example, inserting random process interrupts to prevent sequential operation of an algorithm [14] may be circumvented by resynchronization and integration techniques [4]. In addition, bit masking [15] can be defeated using DPA attacks. Therefore, the most effective approach to prevention of DPA attacks is to include security-based logic within the hardware implementation itself to make it difficult for the attacker to ascertain the necessary information to determine the inputs. The three most important metrics to consider when designing CMOS circuits for this purpose are power consumption, area, and operating frequency, since $E_{\text{diss}} = CL * V_{\text{dd}}^2 * f$, where CL is the load capacitance, V_{dd} is the supply voltage, and f is the operating frequency.

Adiabatic Logic in CMOS:

The adiabatic theorem states that a physical system remains in its instantaneous eigenstate if a given

perturbation is acting on it slowly enough and if there is a gap between the eigenvalue and the rest of the Hamiltonian's spectrum [34]. Since CMOS circuits operate on clock cycles, adiabatic logic design results in a gauge-invariant Berry phase. Normally, when waves are subjected to variations that are self-retracting, then the initial and final states of the system will differ. To prevent this, adiabatic systems are designed reversibly so that the system may always reach its initial state, regardless of the number of cycles it operates. Therefore, the objective of adiabatic logic design is to use the principles of reversible logic to minimize energy dissipation in CMOS circuits.

There are two issues that must be addressed in any adiabatic circuit. First, the implementation must result in an energy efficient design of the combined power supply and clock generator. Second, reversible logic functions require greater logical overhead to meet the objective requirement [25]. Therefore, the energy dissipated by switching of the circuit must be controlled and recycled instead of dissipated into the environment.

PROPOSED PADDL CELL

In this section, we present method for implementation of PADDL design methodology for mitigating DPA attacks in high-performance applications. The data presented in this section was obtained using HPSICE simulations using the 22-nm predictive technology model presented in [28].

The objective of PADDL is to design as a universal cell capable of dynamically performing all of the fundamental two-input logical calculations (AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, and XOR) with the minimal differential power for each logical calculation. The device is both logically and physically bijective. This means that the input waveforms may be uniquely determined by reading the output waveforms, a necessity in implementation of low-power reversible and adiabatic designs.

The logical calculations of the output signals of PADDL are $P = A_-, P_- = A, Q = (A + B) \oplus C, Q_- = (A + B) \oplus C, R = AB \oplus C,$ and $R_- = AB \oplus C$. The truth table of the device is shown in Table I, and the logic outputs of PADDL are presented in Table II. Fig. 2 shows the design process of the PADDL cell. The objective of the basic square circuit diagram is to determine the switches required for an input signal to flow from an input to an output. Consider Fig. 2(a): in order for the output Q to be 1 when input C is a 1, either A or B must be a 1, which would close the switch. The circuit diagram shows whether the switch will open or close when the appropriate input signal is a 1. The output Q is determined in Fig. 2(a) and the output R is determined in Fig. 2(b). Fig. 3 shows the gate level design of the PADDL cell derived from the basic square circuit diagram in Fig. 2. The device has 32 transistors, each of which have their gate, drain, and source tied to an input or output signal. The pMOS transistors are biased to the nominal supply voltage, which is 0.8 V in the 22-nm model in [28], and the nMOS transistors are biased to ground. The advantage of this approach is that evaluation and discharge signals are not required, meaning that less power is consumed by the circuit, even though the device has more transistors.

MORRISON et al.: DESIGN OF ADDL FOR DPA-RESISTANT SECURE INTEGRATED CIRCUITS




Fig. 1. Taxonomy of relevant works.

TABLE I
TRUTH TABLE FOR PROPOSED PADDL CELL

A	A'	B	B'	C	C'	P	P'	Q	Q'	R	R'
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0

TABLE II
PADDL CELL LOGIC OUTPUTS

Control Signal	P	P'	Q	Q'	R	R'
A=0	A'	A	$\overline{B \oplus C}$	$B \oplus C$	C'	C
A=1	A'	A	C'	C	$\overline{B \oplus C}$	$B \oplus C$
B=0	A'	A	$\overline{A \oplus C}$	$A \oplus C$	C'	C
B=1	A'	A	C'	C	$\overline{B \oplus C}$	$B \oplus C$
C=0	A'	A	$\overline{A+B}$	A+B	\overline{AB}	AB
C=1	A'	A	A+B	$\overline{A+B}$	AB	\overline{AB}




Fig. 2. Basic square circuit diagram for the proposed PADDL cell. (a) Logical calculations for the Q and Q_- outputs based on the $A, B,$ and C inputs. (b) Logical calculations for the R and R_- outputs.





Fig. 3. CMOS schematic diagram for proposed PADDL cell.

The arrows in the basic square diagram indicate what will occur if the signal shown is a logic 1. For example, in Fig. 2(a), if A is a logic 1, then there exists a path from C to Q, meaning that the logical values of C and Q will be equivalent. This is because the pMOS/nMOS pair will have the nMOS with 1 and the pMOS with 0, and the path will be activated. In Fig. 2(b), the path from C to R will be switched OFF if A or B is 1. This is because the pMOS/nMOS pair will have the nMOS with 0 and the pMOS with 1. Therefore, to have C equal to R, then A must be 0, and B must be 0.



CONCLUSION


We propose an ADDL design methodology for mitigation of DPA attacks on secure integrated chips. To consider the tradeoff in performance and power consumption, we designed and simulated two universal

cells. The first design is a PADDL, which is optimized for very high operating frequencies. The PADDL cell also improved upon the differential power of a conventional NAND gate by a factor of 112. The second design, BADDL, uses body biasing to improve the switching time and differential power.

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