Securing Cloud Data under Key Exposure

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Abstract:

We propose Bastion, a novel and efficient scheme that guarantees data confidentiality even if the encryption key is leaked and the adversary has access to almost all ciphertext blocks. We analyze the security of Bastion, and we evaluate its performance by means of a prototype implementation. We also discuss practical insights with respect to the integration of Bastion in commercial dispersed storage systems.

Cloud computing is the use of computing resources (hardware and software) that are delivered as a service over a network (typically the Internet). The name comes from the common use of a cloud-shaped symbol as an abstraction for the complex infrastructure it contains in system diagrams. Cloud computing entrusts remote services with a user's data, software and computation. Cloud computing consists of hardware and software resources made available on the Internet as managed third-party services. These services typically provide access to advanced software applications and high-end networks of server computers.


Fig.1.Structure of cloud computing

How Cloud Computing Works?

The goal of cloud computing is to apply traditional supercomputing, or high-performance computing power, normally used by military and research facilities, to perform tens of trillions of computations per second, in consumer-oriented applications such as financial portfolios, to deliver personalized information, to provide data storage or to power large, immersive computer games.

The cloud computing uses networks of large groups of servers typically running low-cost consumer PC technology with specialized connections to spread data-processing chores across them. This shared IT infrastructure contains large pools of systems that are linked together. Often, virtualization techniques are used to maximize the power of cloud computing.

Characteristics and Services Models:

The salient characteristics of cloud computing based on the definitions provided by the National Institute of Standards and Terminology (NIST) are outlined below:

- **On-demand self-service:** A consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring human interaction with each service's provider.

- **Broad network access:** Capabilities are available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs).

- **Resource pooling:** The provider's computing resources are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with

different physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. There is a sense of location-independence in that the customer generally has no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or data center). Examples of resources include storage, processing, memory, network bandwidth, and virtual machines.

- **Rapid elasticity:** Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically provisioned, in some cases automatically, to quickly scale out and rapidly released to quickly scale in. To the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be purchased in any quantity at any time.

- **Measured service:** Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource usage can be managed, controlled, and reported providing transparency for both the provider and consumer of the utilized service.

Fig.2.Characteristics of cloud computing

Services Models:

Cloud Computing comprises three different service models, namely Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). The three service models or layer are completed by an end user layer that encapsulates the end user perspective on cloud services. The model is shown in figure below. If a cloud user accesses services on the infrastructure layer, for instance, she can run her own applications on the resources of a cloud infrastructure and remain responsible for the support, maintenance, and security of these applications herself. If she accesses a service on the application layer, these tasks are normally taken care of by the cloud service provider.

LITERATURE SURVEY

A secret-sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer distributes shares to parties such that only authorized subsets of parties can reconstruct the secret [1]. Secret-sharing schemes are important tools in cryptography and they are used as a building box in many secure protocols, e.g., general protocol for multiparty computation, Byzantine agreement, threshold cryptography, access control, attribute-based encryption, and generalized oblivious transfer. In this survey, we will describe the most important constructions of secret-sharing schemes, explaining the connections between secret-sharing schemes and monotone formulae and monotone span programs. The main problem with known secret-sharing schemes is the large share size: it is exponential in the number of parties. We conjecture that this is unavoidable. We will discuss the known lower bounds on the share size. These lower bounds are fairly weak and there is a big gap between the lower and upper bounds. For linear secret-sharing schemes, which is a class of schemes based on linear algebra that contains most known schemes, super-polynomial lower bounds on the share size are known. We will describe the proofs of these lower bounds. We will also present two results connecting secret-sharing schemes for a Hamiltonian access structure to the NP vs. coNP problem and to a major open problem in cryptography –

constructing oblivious-transfer protocols from one-way functions

Erasure codes provide space-optimal data redundancy to protect against data loss [2]. A common use is to reliably store data in a distributed system, where erasure-coded data are kept in different nodes to tolerate node failures without losing data. In this paper, we propose a new approach to maintain ensure-encoded data in a distributed system. The approach allows the use of space efficient k-of-n erasure codes where n and k are large and the overhead n-k is small. Concurrent updates and accesses to data are highly optimized: in common cases, they require no locks, no two-phase commits, and no logs of old versions of data. We evaluate our approach using an implementation and simulations for larger systems.

One concern in using cloud storage is that the sensitive data should be confidential We investigate, in the Shannon model, the security of constructions corresponding to double and (two-key) triple DES [3]. That is, we consider $F_{k1} (F_{k2} ())$ and $F_{k1} (F_{1 k2} (F_{k1} ()))$ with the component functions being ideal ciphers. This models the resistance of these constructions to \generic" attacks like meet in the middle attacks. sense. We compute a bound on the probability of breaking the double cipher as a function of the number of computations of the base cipher made, and the number of examples of the composed cipher seen, and show that the success probability is the square of that for a single key cipher. meet in the middle is the best possible generic attack against the double cipher. local revocable group signature and identity-based broadcast encryption with constant size ciphertext and private keys. To realize our concept, we equip the broadcast encryption with the dynamic ciphertext update feature, and give formal security guarantee against adaptive chosen-ciphertext decryption and update attacks.

We investigate the all-or-nothing encryption paradigm which was introduced by Rivest as a new mode of operation for block ciphers [4]. The paradigm involves composing an all-or-nothing transform (AONT) with an ordinary encryption mode. The goal is to have secure encryption modes with the additional property that exhaustive key-search attacks on them are slowed down by a factor equal to the number of blocks in the ciphertext. We give a new notion concerned with the privacy of keys that provably captures this key-search resistance property. We suggest a new characterization of AONTs and establish that the resulting all-or-nothing encryption paradigm yields secure encryption modes that also meet this notion of key privacy. A consequence of our new characterization is that we get more efficient ways of instantiating the all-or-nothing encryption paradigm. We describe a simple block-cipher-based AONT and prove it secure in the Shannon Model of a block cipher. We also give attacks against alternate paradigms that were believed to have the above keysearchresistance property.

Deniable encryption, introduced in 1997 by Canetti, Dwork, Naor, and Ostrovsky, guarantees that the sender or the receiver of a secret message is able to "fake" the message encrypted in a specific ciphertext in the presence of a coercing adversary [5], without the adversary detecting that he was not given the real message. To date, constructions are only known either for weakened variants with separate "honest" and "dishonest" encryption algorithms, or for single-algorithm schemes with non-negligible detection probability. We propose the first sender-deniable public key encryption system with a single encryption algorithm and negligible detection probability. We describe a generic interactive construction based on a public key bit encryption scheme that has certain properties, and we give two examples of encryption schemes with these properties, one based on the quadratic residuosity assumption and the other on trapdoor permutations.

EXISTING SYSTEM
If the encryption key is exposed, the only viable means to guarantee confidentiality is to limit the adversary's access to the ciphertext, e.g., by spreading it across

multiple administrative domains, in the hope that the adversary cannot compromise all of them.However, even if the data is encrypted and dispersed across different administrative domains, an adversary equipped with the appropriate keying material can compromise a server in one domain and decrypt ciphertext blocks stored therein.

DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM

Existing AON encryption schemes, however, require *at least* two rounds of block cipher encryptions on the data: one preprocessing round to create the AONT, followed by another round for the actual encryption. Notice that these rounds are sequential, and cannot be parallelized. This results in considerable—often unacceptable— overhead to encrypt and decrypt large files. On the other hand, Bastion requires only one round of encryption— which makes it well-suited to be integrated in existing dispersed storage systems.

PROPOSED SYSTEM

In this paper, we study data confidentiality against an adversary which knows the encryption key and has access to a large fraction of the ciphertext blocks. The adversary can acquire the key either by exploiting flaws or backdoors in the key-generation software, or by compromising the devices that store the keys (e.g., at the user-side or in the cloud). To counter such an adversary, we propose Bastion, a novel and efficient scheme which ensures that plaintext data cannot be recovered as long as the adversary has access to at most all but *two* ciphertext blocks, even when the encryption key is exposed.

ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM

We evaluate the performance of Bastion in comparison with a number of existing encryption schemes. Our results show that Bastion only incurs a negligible performance deterioration (less than 5%) when compared to symmetric encryption schemes, and considerably improves the performance of existing AON encryption schemes.We propose Bastion, an efficient scheme which ensures data confidentiality against an adversary that knows the encryption key and has access to a large fraction of the ciphertext blocks.

SYSTEM DESIGN
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE:

**Fig.3.Adversary process**

DATA FLOW DIAGRAM:

- The DFD is also called as bubble chart. It is a simple graphical formalism that can be used to represent a system in terms of input data to the system, various processing carried out on this data, and the output data is generated by this system.
- The data flow diagram (DFD) is one of the most important modeling tools. It is used to model the system components. These components are the system process, the data used by the process, an external entity that interacts with the system and the information flows in the system.
- DFD shows how the information moves through the system and how it is modified by a series of transformations. It is a graphical technique that depicts information flow and the transformations that are applied as data moves from input to output.
- DFD is also known as bubble chart. A DFD may be used to represent a system at any level of abstraction. DFD may be partitioned into levels that represent increasing information flow and functional detail.

Flow chart

Fig.4. owner side

Flow chart

Fig.5. user side

Flow chart:

Fig.6. cloud page

IMPLEMENTATION

MODULES:

- Data Owner
- Data User
- Admin

MODULES DESCRIPTION:

Data Owner:

In Data Owner module, Initially Data Owner must have to register their detail and admin will approve the registration by sending signature key and private key through email. After successful login he/she have to verify their login by entering signature and private key. Then data Owner can upload files into cloud server with Polynomial key generation. He/she can view the files that are uploaded in cloud by entering the secret file key.

Data User:

In Data User module, Initially Data Users must have to register their detail and admin will approve the registration by sending signature key and private key through email. After successful login he/she have to verify their login by entering signature and private key. Data Users can search all the files upload by data

owners. He/she can send search request to admin then admin will send the search key. After entering the search key he/she can view the file

Admin:

In Admin module, Admin can view all the Data owners and data user's details. Admin will approve the users and send the signature key and private key to the data owners and data users. Also admin will send the search request key to the users. Admin can able see the files in cloud uploaded by the data owners.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we addressed the problem of securing data outsourced to the cloud against an adversary which has access to the encryption key. For that purpose, we introduced a novel security definition that captures data confidentiality against the new adversary. We then proposed Bastion, a scheme which ensures the confidentiality of encrypted data even when the adversary has the encryption key, and all but *two* ciphertext blocks. Bastion is most suitable for settings where the ciphertext blocks are stored in multi-cloud storage systems. In these settings, the adversary would need to acquire the encryption key, and to compromise *all* servers, in order to recover any single block of plaintext. We analyzed the security of Bastion and evaluated its performance in realistic settings. Bastion considerably improves (by more than 50%) the performance of existing primitives which offer comparable security under key exposure, and only incurs a negligible overhead (less than 5%) when compared to existing semantically secure encryption modes (e.g., the CTR encryption mode). Finally, we showed how Bastion can be practically integrated within existing dispersed storage systems.

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