

## Authentication for Mobile and Pervasive Computing Effectively

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### ABSTRACT:

With today's technology, many applications rely on the existence of small devices that can exchange information and form communication networks. In a significant portion of such applications, the confidentiality and integrity of the communicated messages are of particular interest. In this work, we propose two novel techniques for authenticating short encrypted messages that are directed to meet the requirements of mobile and pervasive applications. By taking advantage of the fact that the message to be authenticated must also be encrypted, we propose provably secure authentication codes that are more efficient than any message authentication code in the literature. The key idea behind the proposed techniques is to utilize the security that the encryption algorithm can provide to design more efficient authentication mechanisms, as opposed to using standalone authentication primitives.

### 1 INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK:

PRESERVING the integrity of messages exchanged over public channels is one of the classic goals in cryptography and the literature is rich with message authentication code (MAC) algorithms that are designed for the sole purpose of preserving message integrity. Based on their security, MACs can be either unconditionally or computationally secure. Unconditionally secure MACs provide message integrity against forgers with unlimited computational power. On the other hand, computationally secure MACs are only secure when forgers have limited computational power. A popular class of unconditionally secure authentication is based on universal hash-function families, pioneered by Carter and Wegman [1]. Since then, the study of unconditionally secure message authentication based on universal hash functions has been attracting research attention, both from the design and analysis standpoints (see, e.g., [2], [3], [4], [5]).

The basic concept allowing for unconditional security is that the authentication key can only be used to authenticate a limited number of exchanged messages. Since the management of one-time keys is considered impractical in many applications, computationally secure MACs have become the method of choice for most real-life applications. In computationally secure MACs, keys can be reused to authenticate an arbitrary number of messages. That is, after agreeing on a key, legitimate users can exchange an arbitrary number of authenticated messages with the same key. Depending on the main building block used to construct them, computationally secure MACs can be classified into three main categories: block cipher based, cryptographic hash function based, or universal hash function family based. CBC-MAC is one of the most known block cipher-based MACs, specified in the Federal Information Processing Standards publication 113 [6] and the International Organization for Standardization ISO/IEC 9797-1 [7]. CMAC, a modified version of CBC-MAC, is presented in the NIST special publication 800-38B [8], which was based on the OMAC of [9]. Other block cipher-based MACs include, but are not limited to, XOR-MAC [10] and PMAC [11]. The security of different MACs has been exhaustively studied (see, e.g., [12], [13]). The use of one-way cryptographic hash functions for message authentication was introduced by Tsudik [14]. A popular example of the use of iterated cryptographic hash functions in the design of message authentication codes is HMAC, which was proposed by Bellare et al. [15]. HMAC was later adopted as a standard [16]. Another cryptographic hash function-based MAC is the MDx-MAC proposed by Preneel and Van Oorschot [17]. HMAC and two variants of MDx-MAC are specified in the International Organization for Standardization ISO/IEC 9797-2 [18]. Bosselaers et al. [19] described how cryptographic hash functions can be carefully coded to take advantage of the structure of the Pentium processor to speed up the authentication process. One of the key components towards the successful roll-out of mobile or location based applications is to provide security and privacy guarantees.

Without proper security and privacy guarantees, the rich functionality and services provided by mobile ad-hoc networks can be abused, jeopardizing the safety of users, as well as the performance of the entire network. For example, a malicious user can claim a fake traffic jam to gain the right of the road and cause other vehicles to make an unnecessary detour. The user can also send unfounded negative comments regarding a local business to other users within the same mobile network. As a result, users should be authenticated before they are allowed to access services offered through these dynamically formed mobile networks. Since a user's location can reveal the actual identity of the user, it is in the best interest of the user not to be tracked by service providers or peer users. In many non-critical scenarios, a service provider may only need to know whether the user is authenticated or not, but does not need to know the user's actual identity. Thus, users' privacy should be preserved during authentication in that their identities should be kept private in order to avoid unlawful tracing and user profiling.

More specifically, these parties may cause privacy concerns: (i) the authentication server or service provider; (ii) peer users. The server may obtain the behavior pattern or track the user locations according to the record of the users requesting for authentication. Similarly, other peer users may also be able to track one another through the authentication records. We refer to the privacy concern caused by the server as the server-wise privacy and the privacy concern caused by peer users as the peer-wise privacy. Ideally, we should preserve both server-wise and peer-wise privacy for each mobile user. On the other hand, we should also ensure traceability whereby law enforcement authorities can reveal a user's real identity required when disputes occur. An anonymous credential system that uses zero-knowledge proof was proposed to achieve anonymous authentication. Being the best among the existing work, this scheme achieves several of our proposed goals under privacy-preserving user authentication, but comparing to the proposed solution, the scheme is not very efficient and it is only statistically secure. We will adopt this scheme as a baseline to demonstrate the advantages of our proposed protocol.

## 1.1 Contributions:

To overcome the shortcomings in existing work, we propose a novel randomized / privacy-preserving authentication protocol (namely RAU) that truly preserves users' privacy while still ensures traceability.

The proposed protocol is designed based on Homomorphic encryption [25] and it allows each user to self-generate any number of authenticated identities to prove his or her legal status when communicating with peer users, service providers, or other infrastructure (like road-side units in VANET). In fact, users will be able to easily use a new identity for each newly established communication. These randomized identities can be verified through the collaboration of a pair of authentication servers while each authentication server would not know the real identity of the authentication requester. In this way, we achieve both peer-wise and server-wise privacy preservation. For traceability, the pair of authentication servers need to execute a collaborative protocol so that the real identity of the malicious user can be identified. We summarize the advantages of our proposed authentication protocol as follows.

- Under our authentication protocol, users' real identities are hidden from each individual party including authentication servers, peer users, service providers, and other infrastructure.
- Our protocol achieves a set of desired security and privacy properties such as unforgeability, unlinkability and traceability. It is robust against various types of attacks (as discussed later in Section 5).
- Our approach no longer has the key revocation problem neither the costly group management. Specifically, users using the proposed protocol no longer need to preload a huge number of keys (i.e., pseudonyms) or rely on others (i.e., peers or infrastructure) to generate the pseudonyms. Our experimental study demonstrates the proposed protocol is very efficient.
- Our protocol does not require users to be equipped with high performance computing equipment since almost all computations are outsourced to the servers and the users only need to generate several encryptions and random numbers.
- User authentication is very efficient in our protocol well under the 100ms requirement [20]. Since anonymity revocation needs not to be done as a real-time application (due to court orders), our protocol provides reasonable computation time (as presented in Section 6).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3 introduces some preliminary notions of encryption adopted in this work. Section 4 presents the proposed randomized authentication protocol. Section 5 discusses the possible attacks and the security and privacy properties of the protocol.

Then, Section 6 reports the experimental results. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines future research directions.

## 1.2 Organization:

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we list our notations and discuss some preliminaries. In Section 3, we describe the first authentication technique assuming messages do not exceed a maximum length, discuss its performance advantages over existing Techniques, and prove its security. In Section 4, we propose a modification to the scheme of Section 3 that provides a stronger notion of integrity. In Section 5, we describe the second technique assuming the encryption is block cipher based, discuss its performance, and prove its security. In Section 6, we conclude the paper.


## 2 AUTHENTICATING SHORT ENCRYPTED MESSAGES:

In this section, we describe our first authentication scheme that can be used with any IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm. An important assumption we make is that **ALOMAIR AND POOVENDRAN: EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION FOR MOBILE AND PERVASIVE COMPUTING** 471 messages to be authenticated are no longer than a predefined length. This includes applications in which messages are of fixed length that is known a priori, such as RFID systems in which tags need to authenticate their identifiers, sensor nodes reporting events that belong to certain domain or measurements within a certain range and so on. The novelty of the proposed scheme is to utilize the encryption algorithm to deliver a random string and use it to reach the simplicity and efficiency of one-time pad authentication without the need to manage impractically long keys.

### 2.1 The Proposed System:

Let  $N - 1$  be an upper bound on the length, in bits, of exchanged messages. That is, messages to be authenticated can be no longer than  $(N - 1)$ -bit long. Choose  $p$  to be an  $N$ -bit long prime integer. (If  $N$  is too small to provide the desired security level,  $p$  can be chosen large enough to satisfy the required security level.) Choose an integer  $k$  uniformly at random from the multiplicative group  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ;  $ks$  is the secret key of the scheme.

The prime integer,  $p$ , and the secret key,  $ks$ , are distributed to legitimate users and will be used for message authentication. Note that the value of  $p$  need not be secret, only  $ks$  is secret.



Note, however, that the authentication tag is a function of the confidential message. Therefore, the authentication tag must not reveal information about the plaintext since, otherwise, the confidentiality of the encryption algorithm is compromised. Before we give formal security analysis of the proposed technique, we first discuss its performance compared to existing techniques.

### 2.2 Data Privacy:

We show in this section that the privacy of the proposed composition is provably secure assuming the underlying encryption algorithm provides indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Consider an adversary,  $B$ , who is given oracle access to the encryption algorithm,  $E$ . The adversary calls the encryption oracle on a polynomial number of messages of her choice and records the corresponding ciphertexts. The adversary then chooses two equal-length messages,  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , and gives them to the encryption oracle. The oracle draws a bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  uniformly at random, encrypts  $m_b$ , and gives the adversary the resulting ciphertext. The adversary is allowed to perform additional calls to the encryption oracle and eventually outputs a bit,  $b_0$ . We define the adversary's advantage of breaking the IND-CPA security of the encryption algorithm,  $E$ , as her probability of successfully guessing the correct bit (equivalently knowing to which plaintext the ciphertext corresponds). As stated in (1),  $E$  provides IND-CPA if the adversary has a negligible advantage of guessing the right bit over an adversary choosing a bit uniformly at random. Now, let  $\pi$  denote the proposed authenticated encryption composition described in Section 3.1. Let  $A$  be an adversary against the privacy of  $\pi$  and let  $\text{Adv}_{\text{priv}}^{\pi}(A)$  denote adversary's  $A$  advantage in breaking the privacy of the system, where the privacy of the system is modeled as its indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks. One gets the following theorem. Theorem 1.



Let  $\_$  be the authenticated encryption composition described in Section 3.1 using  $E$  as the underlying encryption algorithm. Then given an adversary,  $A$ , against the privacy of  $\_$ , one can construct an adversary,  $B$ , against  $E$ . Theorem 1 states that an adversary breaking the privacy of the proposed system will also be able to break the IND-CPA of the underlying encryption algorithm. Therefore, if  $E$  provides IND-CPA, the adversary's advantage of exposing private information about the system is negligible. Note that private information here refers not only to the encrypted messages, but also the secret key,  $ks$ , as well as the secret key of the encryption algorithm.

### 3.CONCLUSION:

In this work, a new technique for authenticating shortened messages is proposed. The fact that the message to be authenticated must also be encrypted is used to deliver a random nonce to the intended receiver via the ciphertext. This allowed the design of an authentication code that benefits from the simplicity of unconditionally secure authentication without the need to manage one-time keys. In particular, it has been demonstrated in this paper that authentication tags can be computed with one addition and a one modular multiplication. Given that messages are relatively short, addition and modular multiplication can be performed faster than existing computationally secure MACs in the literature of cryptography. When devices are equipped with block ciphers to encrypt messages, a second technique that utilizes the fact that block ciphers can be modeled as strong pseudorandom permutations is proposed to authenticate messages using a single modular addition. The proposed schemes are shown to be orders of magnitude faster, and consume orders of magnitude less energy than traditional MAC algorithms. Therefore, they are more suitable to be used in computationally constrained mobile and pervasive devices.

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