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Performance and Cost Evaluation of an Adaptive Encryption Architecture for Cloud Databases

K.Jaya Kumari

M Tech Student, Computer Networks and Information Technology, Department of CSE, Malla Reddy College of Engineering, Affiliated to JNTUH, Secunderabad, 500010, Telengana, India.

Abstract:

The cloud database as a service is a novel paradigm that can support several Internet-based applications, but its adoption requires the solution of information confidentiality problems. We propose a novel architecture for adaptive encryption of public cloud databases that offers an interesting alternative to the tradeoff between the required data confidentiality level and the flexibility of the cloud database structures at design time. We demonstrate the feasibility and performance of the proposed solution through a software prototype. Moreover, we propose an original cost model that is oriented to the evaluation of cloud database services in plain and encrypted instances and that takes into account the variability of cloud prices and tenant workloads during a medium-term period.

Keywords:

Cloud database, confidentiality, encryption, adaptively.

1.Introduction:

Database as a service paradigm (DBaaS) that poses several research challenges in terms of security and cost evaluation from a tenant's point of view. Most results concerning encryption for cloud-based services are inapplicable to the database paradigm. Other encryption schemes that allow the execution of SQL operations over encrypted data either have performance limits or require the choice of which encryption scheme must be adopted for each database column and SQL operation. These latter proposals are fine when the set of queries can be statically determined at design time, while we are interested in other common scenarios where the workload may change after the database design. In this paper, we propose a novel architecture for adaptive encryption of public cloud databases that offers a proxy-free alternative to the system. T.Ramya

Assistant Professor, Department of CSE, Malla Reddy College of Engineering, Affiliated to JNTUH, Secunderabad, 500010, Telengana, India.

The proposed architecture guarantees in an adaptive way the best level of data confidentiality for any database workload, even when the set of SQL queries dynamically changes. The adaptive encryption scheme, which was initially proposed for applications not referring to the cloud, encrypts each plain column to multiple encrypted columns, and each value is encapsulated in different layers of encryption, so that the outer layers guarantee higher confidentiality but support fewer computation capabilities with respect to the inner layers. The outer layers are dynamically adapted at runtime when new SQL operations are added to the workload. Although this adaptive encryption architecture is attractive because it does not require to define at design time which database operations are allowed on each column, it poses novel issues in terms of applicability to a cloud context, and doubts about storage and network costs. We investigate each of these issues and we reach three original conclusions in terms of prototype implementation, performance evaluation, and cost evaluation

We initially design the first proxy-free architecture for adaptive encryption of cloud databases that does not limit the availability, elasticity and scalability of a plain cloud database because multiple clients can issue concurrent operations without passing through some centralized component as in alternative architectures. Then, we evaluate the performance of encrypted database services by assuming the standard TPC-C benchmark as the workload and by considering different network latencies. Thanks to this testbed, we show that most performance overheads of adaptively encrypted cloud databases are masked by network latencies that are typical of a geographically distributed cloud scenario. Finally, we propose the first analytical cost estimation model for evaluating cloud database costs in plaintext and encrypted configurations from a tenant's point of view over a medium-term period.

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This model also considers the variability of cloud prices and of the database workload during the evaluation period, and allows a tenant to observe how adaptive encryption influences the costs related to storage and network usage of a database service. By applying the model to several cloud provider offers and related prices, the tenant can choose the best compromise between the data confidentiality level and consequent costs in his period of interest.

2 Related Works:

Although data encryption seems the most intuitive solution for confidentiality, its application to cloud database services is not trivial, because the cloud database must be able to execute SQL operations directly over encrypted data without accessing any decryption key. Native solutions encrypt the whole database through some standard encryption algorithms that do not allow to execute any SOL operation directly on the cloud. As a consequence, the tenant has two alternatives: download the entire database, decrypt it, execute the query and, if the operation modifies the database, encrypt and upload the new data; decrypt temporarily the cloud database, execute the query, and re-encrypt it. The former solution is affected by huge communication and computation overheads, and consequent costs that would make cloud database services quite inconvenient; the latter solution does not guarantee data confidentiality because the cloud provider obtains decryption keys.

The right alternative is to execute SQL operations directly on the cloud database, without giving decryption keys to the provider. An initial solution presented in is based on data aggregation techniques that associate plaintext metadata to sets of encrypted data. However, plaintext metadata may leak sensitive information and data aggregation introduces unnecessary network overheads. The use of fully homomorphism encryption would guarantee the execution of any operation over encrypted data, but existing implementations are affected by huge computational costs to the extent that the execution of SQL operations over a cloud database would become impractical.Other encryption algorithms characterized by acceptable computational complexity support a subset of SQL operators. The drawback related to these feasible encryption algorithms is that in a medium-long term horizon, the database administrator cannot know at design time which database operations will be required over each database column.

This issue is in part addressed in by proposing an adaptive encryption architecture that is founded on an intermediate and trusted proxy. This tenant's component, which mediates all the interactions between the clients and a possibly untrusted DBMS server, is fine for a locally distributed architecture but it cannot be applied to a cloud context. Indeed, any centralized component at the tenant side reduces the scalability and availability that are among the most important features of cloud services. The proposed architecture allows multiple clients to issue concurrent SQL operations to an encrypted database without any intermediate trusted server, but it assumes that the set of SQL operations does not change after the database design. This paper develops the initial design through a prototype implementation, novel experimental results and an original cost model. Indeed, besides data confidentiality, unclear costs are a main concern for cloud tenants. To this purpose, we propose an analytical cost model and a usage estimation methodology that allow a tenant to estimate the costs deriving from cloud database services characterized by plain, encrypted and adaptively encrypted databases over a medium-term horizon during which it is likely that both the database workload and the cloud prices change. This model is another original contribution of this paper because previous research focuses on the costs of cloud computing from a provider's perspective. This paper has a focus on database services and takes an opposite direction by evaluating the cloud service costs from a tenant's point of view.

3 Architecture Design:

The proposed system supports adaptive encryption for public cloud database services, where distributed and concurrent clients can issue direct SQL operations. By avoiding an architecture based on intermediate servers between the clients and the cloud database, the proposed solution guarantees the same level of scalability and availability of the cloud service. Fig. 1 shows a scheme of the proposed architecture where each client executes an encryption engine that manages encryption operations. This software module is accessed by external user applications through the encrypted database interface. The proposed architecture manages five types of information: plain data represent the tenant information; encrypted data are the encrypted version of the plain data, and are stored in the cloud database; plain metadata represent the additional information that is necessary to execute SQL operations on encrypted data; encrypted metadata are the encrypted



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version of the plain metadata, and are stored in the cloud database; master key is the encryption key of the encrypted metadata, and is known by legitimate clients. All data and metadata stored in the cloud database are encrypted. Any application running on a legitimate client can transparently issue SQL operations to the encrypted cloud database through the encrypted database interface. Data transferred between the user application and the encryption engine are not encrypted, whereas information is always encrypted before sending it to the cloud database. When an application issues a new SQL operation, the encrypted database interface contacts the encryption engine that retrieves the encrypted metadata and decrypts them with the master key. To improve performance, the plain metadata are cached locally by the client. After obtaining the metadata, the encryption engine is able to issue encrypted SQL statements to the cloud database, and then to decrypt the results.





4.Cost Estimation Of Cloud Database Service:

We consider a tenant that is interested in estimating the cost of porting his database to a cloud platform. This porting is a strategic decision that must evaluate confidentiality issues and related costs over a medium-long term. For these reasons, we propose a model that includes the overhead of encryption schemes and the variability of database workload and cloud prices. The proposed model is general enough to be applied to the most popular cloud database services, such as Amazon Relational Database Service, Enterprise DB, Windows Azure SQL Database, and Rack space Cloud Database.

The cost of a cloud database service can be estimated as afunction of three main parameters:

Cost=f(Time,Pricing,Usage)

where:

Time identifies the time interval T for which the tenant requires the service. Pricing refers to the prices of the cloud provider for subscription and resource usage; they typically tend to diminish during T. Usage denotes the total amount of resources used by the tenant; it typically increases during T. In order to detail the Pricing attribute, it is important to specify that cloud providers adopt two subscription policies: the on-demand policy allows a tenant to pay-per-use and to withdraw his subscription anytime; the reservation policy requires the tenant to commit in advance for a reservation period. Hence, we distinguish between billing costs that depend on resource usage and reservation costs denoting additional fees for commitment in exchange for lower payper-use prices. Billing costs are billed periodically to the tenant every billing period TB. Moreover, if the tenant adopts the reservation policy, the cloud provider requires the payment of the reservation cost at the beginning of each reservation period TR.

5. Performance Evaluation: 2.Equations

If you are using Word, use either the Microsoft Equation Editor or the MathType add-on (http://www.mathtype. com) for equations in your paper (Insert | Object | Create New | Microsoft Equation or MathType Equation). "Float over text" should not be selected. Number equations consecutively with equation numbers in parentheses flush with the right margin, as in (1). First use the equation editor to create the equation. Then select the "Equation" markup style. Press the tab key and write the equation number in parentheses. This section aims to verify whether the overheads of adaptive encryption represent an acceptable compromise between performance and data confidentiality for the tenants of cloud database services. To this purpose, we design a suite of performance tests that allow us to evaluate the impact of encryption and adaptive encryption on response times and throughput for different network latencies and for increasing numbers of concurrent clients.d a 7,200 RPM 500 GB SATA disk. The current version of the prototype supports the main SQL operations (SELECT, DELETE, INSERT and UPDATE) and the WHERE clause. We consider three TPC-C compliant databases having 10 warehouses: Plaintext (PLAIN) is based on plaintext data.

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Encrypted (ENC) refers to a statically encrypted database where each column is encrypted at design time with only one encryption algorithm. Adaptively encrypted (ADAPT) refers to an encrypted database in which each column is encrypted with all the onions supported by its data type (Section 3.3). In the ENC and ADAPT configurations each column is set to the highest encryption layer that supports the SQL operations of the TPC-C workload. During each TPC-C test lasting for 300 seconds, we monitor the number of executed TPC-C transactions, and the response times of all the SQL operations from the standard TPC-C workload. We repeat the test for each database configuration (PLAIN, ENC and ADAPT) for increasing number of clients (from 5 to 20), and for increasing network latencies (from 0 to 120 ms). To guarantee data consistency the three databases use repeatable read (snapshot) isolation level

6.Conclusions:

There are two main tenant concerns that may prevent the adoption of the cloud as the fifth utility: data confidentiality and costs. This paper addresses both issues in the case of cloud database services. These applications have not vet received adequate attention by the academic literature, but they are of utmost importance if we consider that almost all important services are based on one or multiple databases. We address the data confidentiality concerns by proposing a novel cloud database architecture that uses adaptive encryption techniques with no intermediate servers. This scheme provides tenants with the best level of confidentiality for any database workload that is likely to change in a medium-term period. We investigate the feasibility and performance of the proposed architecture through a large set of experiments based on a software prototype subject to the TPC-C standard benchmark.

Our results demonstrate that the network latencies that are typical of cloud database environments hide most overheads related to static and adaptive encryption. Moreover, we propose a model and a methodology that allow a tenant to estimate the costs of plain and encrypted cloud database services even in the case of workload and cloud price variations in a medium-term horizon. By applying the model to actual cloud provider prices, we can determine the encryption and adaptive encryption costs for data confidentiality. Future research could evaluate the proposed or alternative architectures for multi-user key distribution schemes and under different threat model hypotheses.

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